Non-Compete Period
A non-compete period is the length of time after an executive’s departure during which the employment agreement restricts them from working for a competing business. It is stated in the agreement and summarized in the proxy’s description of executive termination arrangements, and it is usually limited to defined competing activities and a defined geography. Whether the restriction can actually be enforced depends on state law, which differs sharply from one state to another.
A non-compete period is the length of time after an executive’s departure during which the employment agreement restricts them from working for a competing business. The period is stated in the agreement and summarized in the proxy’s description of executive termination and severance arrangements. It typically runs from the date of termination, and the restriction is usually confined to a defined competitive business and a defined geographic area rather than to an entire industry.
A non-compete is ordinarily supported by consideration, which for an executive is commonly the severance itself or continued payment across the restricted period. That link matters in practice: where a company conditions severance on compliance with the non-compete, a breach can cut off payments the executive would otherwise receive, and the agreement generally says so expressly.
A non-compete period is usually paired with a non-solicitation covenant covering employees and customers, and often with a confidentiality covenant as well. The three are legally distinct, and a court can enforce one while declining another in the same agreement. A confidentiality obligation often survives indefinitely, while a non-compete or non-solicit runs for a stated term.
Enforceability is governed by state law, and the states differ sharply. Some enforce reasonable restrictions of limited duration and scope, while others restrict or void non-compete provisions for employees generally. That is why a company headquartered in one state may not be able to rely on an identical clause for an executive working in another, and why a choice-of-law clause in the agreement does not always settle the question.
Where non-competes are enforceable, courts generally test duration, geographic scope, and the range of restricted activity together, weighing the employer’s legitimate interest in protecting confidential information and customer relationships against the executive’s ability to earn a living. A long period covering a broad set of activities is more likely to be trimmed or refused than a shorter one tied to the business the executive actually ran.
The disclosed length says something on its own, independent of whether the clause would be enforced. A company that binds a departing chief executive for longer than is typical among its peers is signaling how much competitive risk it assigns to that person’s knowledge and relationships, which is a governance fact a reader can weigh alongside the period itself.
Executive non-competes sit inside a wider debate about non-competes generally, since several states have narrowed their use and regulators have questioned them as a matter of policy. For a reader of a proxy, the practical point is that a disclosed period describes a contractual term the company negotiated; its real force depends on the law that would apply if the restriction were ever tested.
The restricted period and the severance period do not have to match. An agreement may pay severance as a lump sum while the non-compete runs longer, or pay severance across the same span as the restriction, which turns the severance into compensation for not competing. Which structure applies is a disclosed detail rather than something to infer from the length of either period alone.
- The agreement states a periodThe length is measured from the date of termination, and the clause defines which competing activities and which geography it covers.
- Consideration is identifiedSeverance, salary continuation across the restricted period, or another benefit supports the restriction, and the agreement identifies which.
- Companion covenants are read alongsideA non-solicit and a confidentiality covenant are separate obligations that can carry different terms and different durations.
- State law is appliedWhether the restriction can be enforced depends on the law that governs the dispute, which is not always the state named in the agreement.
- Reasonableness is assessedDuration, geography, and the scope of restricted activity are weighed against the employer’s interest in protecting confidential information and relationships.
- Breach consequences attachWhere severance is conditioned on compliance, a breach can stop payments or require repayment, as the agreement provides.
Non-compete period How long the executive is barred from competing after departure. | 36 months |
Non-solicit period How long the executive is barred from soliciting. | 36 months |
Officer The executive whose terms these are. | Chief Operating Officer |
A Wintrust employment agreement discloses a non-compete period of 36 months following departure.
See WTFC’s full page →- The narrative description of employment and severance arrangements in the proxy
- A summary of the restrictive covenants for named executive officers, including the length of the non-compete and any accompanying non-solicit.
- The "Potential Payments Upon Termination or Change in Control" section of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis
- Whether severance is conditioned on compliance with the restrictive covenants, and what happens to the payments if the executive breaches them.
- Exhibits filed with the annual report or proxy statement
- The agreement text, where the definition of a competing business, the geographic reach, and any carve-outs can be read in full.
- A standard form of restrictive covenant agreement filed as an exhibit, where the company uses one
- The terms applied to a group of executives rather than negotiated individually, which shows the company’s default position.
Two restrictive covenants that are frequently paired but restrict different conduct.
| Non-compete | Non-solicit | |
|---|---|---|
| What it restricts | Working for a competing business | Soliciting the company’s employees or customers |
| Typical duration | A stated period after departure | A stated period, often similar in length |
| Effect on the executive | Narrows where they can work | Narrows who they can approach, but not where they work |
| Enforceability | Varies widely by state, and some states void it for employees generally | Enforceable in more jurisdictions than a non-compete |
| Consideration | Commonly the severance or payments across the period | Usually the same consideration as the accompanying non-compete |
| Interaction with severance | A breach can stop or claw back severance where the agreement provides | The same mechanism, stated in its own provision |
- That a disclosed non-compete period is automatically enforceable: enforceability turns on state law and on the scope of the restriction, whatever the agreement says.
- That the restricted period and the severance period are the same thing: one governs conduct after departure and the other governs payment, and they are set separately.
- That a non-compete bars an executive from the whole industry: it reaches only the competing activities and geography the agreement defines.
- Employment AgreementThe contract or CD&A-disclosed terms that carry the non-compete and the other restrictive covenants alongside the severance provisions.
- Severance MultipleThe formula for the severance payment that is often conditioned on compliance with the non-compete period.
- Golden ParachuteThe change-in-control severance package that restrictive covenants usually survive and continue to govern.