Clawback Policy
A clawback policy is a company’s stated mechanism for recovering incentive-based compensation that has already been paid to an executive, most often after an accounting restatement. Every U.S.-listed company has been required to adopt a policy of this kind under Dodd-Frank Section 954, the SEC rule implementing it and the listing standards at the NYSE and Nasdaq. The mandatory version is not fault-based: it triggers on the restatement, whether or not the executive did anything wrong.
A clawback policy is a company’s stated mechanism for recovering incentive-based compensation that has already been paid to an executive. For U.S.-listed companies it is not optional: Dodd-Frank Section 954 directed the SEC to require recovery of erroneously awarded compensation, and the resulting rule, Exchange Act Rule 10D-1, together with the listing standards it produced at the NYSE and Nasdaq, made a compliant policy mandatory for every listed issuer, with the requirements taking effect in 2023.
The mandatory policy reaches incentive compensation tied to a financial reporting measure, and that category is broader than an annual bonus tied to revenue or earnings. The rule treats stock price and total shareholder return as financial reporting measures, which brings performance equity into scope alongside cash incentives.
It also reaches past the executive who signed the numbers. The policy applies to incentive compensation received by current and former executive officers during the three completed fiscal years immediately preceding the date the company is required to prepare a restatement, and recovery is required reasonably promptly once the excess is determined.
The policy is not fault-based. Recovery is triggered by the restatement itself, whether the executive caused the error, missed it, or had no involvement in it at all. That is a different question from the enforcement and liability issues a misstatement can separately raise, and a policy that recovers nothing because no one was found at fault is still being applied as written.
Two kinds of restatement count. The rule covers a "Big R" restatement, which corrects a material error in previously issued financial statements, and a "little r" restatement, which corrects an error that is not material to those statements but would be material if left uncorrected in the current period. A company cannot narrow its policy to only the more serious of the two.
What is recoverable is the excess: the incentive compensation received that would not have been received had the amount been calculated on the restated figures, determined on a pre-tax basis. A company may not indemnify an executive against that loss, and may not pay or reimburse the cost of insurance that would cover it.
The rule permits only narrow exceptions, and a company that declines to recover must explain which one applies. They are limited to cases where pursuing recovery would be impracticable because the direct expense of enforcement would exceed the amount recoverable, because recovery would violate a home-country law in force before the rule took effect, or because it would cause a tax-qualified retirement plan to fail to meet the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.
Separately, many companies layer a broader discretionary policy on top of the mandatory one, extending recovery to misconduct, risk failures, or compensation tied to measures that are not financial reporting measures. The mandatory policy itself is filed as an exhibit to the annual report, and disclosure of a restatement that required recovery, including any amount still unrecovered, appears in the proxy under Item 402(w) of Regulation S-K. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act remains a separate and narrower recovery provision that applies to the chief executive and chief financial officer after a restatement caused by misconduct.
- A restatement becomes requiredThe company concludes that previously issued financial statements contain a material error, or an error that would be material if left uncorrected in the current period.
- The lookback window is fixedThe rule reaches incentive compensation received by current and former executive officers during the three completed fiscal years before the date the restatement is required.
- The excess is recomputedIncentive pay is recalculated against the restated financial figures, and the difference between what was paid and what the restated numbers support is the recoverable amount, determined pre-tax.
- Recovery is pursuedThe company must recover reasonably promptly, from former officers as well as current ones. Indemnification and insurance for the loss are prohibited.
- Any exception is explainedWhere recovery is impracticable, the company must identify which of the narrow permitted exceptions applies rather than simply declining to recover.
- The policy and the outcome are disclosedThe policy is filed as an exhibit to the annual report, and Item 402(w) of Regulation S-K calls for disclosure of a restatement that required recovery and any amount still outstanding.
Recovery type Whether recovery is mandatory or left to the board’s discretion. | Discretionary |
Applies to The officer whose terms carry the provision. | Chief Executive Officer |
Source filing The filing type in which the provision appears. | 8-K |
Filing date The date the filing was made. | January 9, 2023 |
MarketAxess's disclosed clawback provision leaves compensation recovery to the board or committee's discretion, without further specifics on triggers or amounts, as the agreement states it.
See MKTX’s full page →- Exhibit 97 to the annual report on Form 10-K
- The text of the mandatory recovery policy a listed company has adopted under the exchange listing standards.
- Item 402(w) of Regulation S-K, in the proxy statement or annual report
- Disclosure of any restatement that required recovery, how the recoverable amount was determined, and any amount still unrecovered at period end.
- The Compensation Discussion and Analysis
- How the compensation committee applies the policy, and how it relates to the company’s broader approach to incentive pay.
- A standalone discretionary clawback policy, where the company maintains one
- Terms that go beyond the mandatory rule, such as recovery for misconduct or for compensation tied to non-financial measures.
The two are often described with the same word, but they are separate policies with different triggers and different reach.
| Mandatory clawback | Discretionary clawback | |
|---|---|---|
| Trigger | An accounting restatement, with or without misconduct | Whatever the company names, commonly misconduct, a risk failure, or a policy breach |
| Fault required | None; the restatement alone triggers recovery | Usually a finding or determination by the board or a committee |
| Compensation covered | Incentive pay tied to a financial reporting measure, including stock price and total shareholder return | Any element the policy names, which can include time-based equity and salary |
| Lookback period | The three completed fiscal years before the restatement is required | Whatever period the policy states |
| Who is covered | Executive officers, current and former | Whichever employees or officers the policy names |
| Recovery decision | Required, subject to narrow impracticability exceptions | Discretionary |
| Where it appears | Filed as an exhibit, with Item 402(w) disclosure of outcomes | Described in the CD&A, the policy, or the employment agreement |
- Reading a clawback policy as fault-based — the mandatory rule recovers incentive pay after a restatement whether or not the executive was responsible for the error.
- Assuming a policy reaches only unvested equity still held — the mandatory rule reaches incentive compensation already paid, not just awards that have not yet vested.
- Treating the existence of a policy as evidence that a recovery has occurred — a policy is a standing commitment, and an actual restatement and recovery is a separate disclosure.
- Employment AgreementThe negotiated contract setting an executive’s pay and severance terms; clawback provisions may sit inside it or in a separate company policy.
- Non-Equity Incentive Plan CompensationCash bonus paid under a pre-established performance plan, which is the kind of incentive pay a clawback policy reaches when its goals are financial measures.
- Performance Stock Unit (PSU)An equity award that vests and pays out on meeting performance goals, bringing it within a clawback policy when the goal is a financial reporting measure.
- Summary Compensation Table (SCT)The mandatory proxy table reporting each named executive officer’s pay by column, and the starting point for seeing which pay elements a policy could recover.